TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS 1995-96

Between 1995 and 1996, as Taiwan was preparing for their first direct presidential
election, China flexed its military muscles by firing numerous missiles within a radius of thirty-
five miles and held multiple military exercises off the ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung 1 . These
exercises caused panic in Taiwan and prompted the deployment of a carrier battle group to
international waters located near Taiwan under the order of the then United States president
William J. Clinton. These events led to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, which disrupted
commercial air traffic and naval shipping, causing significant damage to Taiwan’s economy 2 .
Amidst concerns of a possible invasion, fueled by planned exercises by the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) mimicking amphibious live-fire exercises and assault near the outlying Penghu
Island, the Taiwanese government scrambled to reserve flight seats to North America. The
strategy pursued by the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96 is a pity because the crisis faded away, becoming a distant
memory, and its implications have not been received their deserved attention.

Strategy
State Policy Goals Before and After the Crisis
The United States policy towards Taiwan is founded on the Taiwan policy review, the
Taiwan Relations Act, the six assurances provided to Taiwan, and the three communiques
between the PRC and the United States 3 . For over twenty years, the United States policy towards
Taiwan has been not only consistent but also longstanding. The friendship between the
Taiwanese and American people is firm, and the U.S. is committed to faithfully implementing
the Taiwan Relations Act 4 . The elements of the United States policy towards Taiwan are diverse

1. Ross, Robert S. “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion.” Credibility, and the 2000).
2. Ross, 2000.
3. Ibid.

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and multifaceted. Firstly, the United States acknowledges the existence of one China. However,
defining and realizing this existence is left to the two sides of the Taiwan Straits to establish a
reciprocally acceptable foundation. Secondly, the United States, through Washington, inspires a
cross-strait negotiation but will remain even-handed and cease from applying mediation or
pressure to either side of the strait 5 . Taiwan is a democracy; hence, any engagements between the
two sides of the strait have to be accepted by the Taiwanese.
Thirdly, the United States recommends a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. The
U.S. considers any form of hostile action against the Taiwanese a threat to the security and peace
of the Western Pacific, making it a matter of inordinate concern 6 . The fourth policy element of
the United States policy towards Taiwan is founded on the Taiwan Relations Act. Based on this
act, the United States will provide necessary services and articles for maintaining Taiwan’s
sufficient aptitude to defend itself. The fifth element of the U.S. policy regards the international
space of Taiwan 7 . In acknowledgement of the crucial role played by Taiwan in global issues, the
United States supports Taiwan’s affiliation where statehood is not a precondition. In this regard,
the U.S. champions for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in many international organizations where the
country’s membership is impossible 8 .

Instruments of Power Used by the U.S. and China to achieve their Goals

4. Ross, 2000.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

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The United States and China accomplished their strategic objectives due to their
involvement in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995 and 1996 9 . However, many scholars posit that
the use of force by China in 1996 coerced the then United States administration under Clinton to
reverse the trend towards enhancing the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan and opposing
the independence of the country. The Taiwan Strait confrontation is a reflection of the U.S.
deterrence diplomacy and the Chinese coercive diplomacy 10 . While the Chinese applied coercive
diplomacy to force Taiwan and the United States to change their policies due to threatened costs,
the United States responded by applying deterrence diplomacy to communicate the reliability of
its deliberate component to China and other regional leaders. Washington did not use its military
force to defend its Taiwan policies. Instead, the aim of America’s’ use of force was aimed at
protecting its strategic standing by manipulating the U.S. resolve perceptions 11 .
The objective of the Chinese use of coercion was to force the United States to end its
direct and increase significant support for Taiwan’s independence 12 . In so doing, China forced the
then Clinton government to reevaluate its correlation with Taiwan’s governance and review the
United States’ position concerning the role of Taiwan in global politics. Additionally, China also
sought to coerce Taiwan and force it to abandon its efforts towards redefining its status in global
politics and the ‘one China’ principle 13 . The use of force is considered by scholars and researchers
as an essential component in Beijing’s coercive diplomacy. The large-scale missile tests and
military exercises conducted by China were aimed at signaling Taiwan and the United States
concerning the remarkable risks characteristic of their policies 14 . The use of force made by the

9. Ross, 2000.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ross, 2000.

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Chinese made the prospective costs of Taiwan and United States policy more dependable and the
coercive diplomacy of China more effective.
Analysis

SAF Evaluation of the Efficacy of the U.S. use of Deterrence Diplomacy in Taiwan
SAF evaluation of the deterrence policy used by the United States in Taiwan aims to
establish the sustainability, acceptability, and feasibility of the policy.
Sustainability
This is an essential factor in the SAF strategy model of evaluation. Notably, the
sustainability of the United States’ deterrence policy is crucial for establishing whether this
strategy will achieve the country’s requirement objective in the region. Notably, the use of
deterrence policy proved sustainable in communicating the reliability of its deliberate component
to China and other regional leaders.
Acceptability
This aspect of the SAF strategy is crucial for measuring the risk, return, and stakeholder
reactions resulting from the use of deterrence policy by the United States during the Taiwan
Strait Crisis in 1995-96. Notably, this policy was accepted by the Taiwanese because it protected
them from China. However, China reacted by applying coercive diplomacy to force Taiwan and
the United States to change their policies due to threatened costs.
Feasibility
This aspect represents the make or break of the deterrence policy adopted by the United
States during the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Notably, the financial feasibility of this strategy can be

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assessed by the United States by analyzing and forecasting the cash-flows during the
implementation of the strategy. Notably, the United States effectively funded its operation in the
Taiwan Strait confrontation to help avert China’s missile tests that threatened the stability of
Taiwan and its environs.

Assessment

Successes Achieved and Challenges faced by the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait Crisis
China and the United States had varied objectives in their confrontation over Taiwan
during the 1995 to 1996 crisis. While China’s use of force enabled it to achieve substantial policy
gains, the United States, on the other hand, employed force to allow it to attain reputational
gains 15 . The United States, as well as China, successfully achieved their varied goals. Despite
their successes, the United States and China paid the price for their involvement in the Taiwan
Strait Crisis. The deterrence diplomacy employed by the United States in the crisis enabled it to
achieve significant benefits 16 . Notably, the U.S. preserved its reputation for resisting the Chinese
use of force against the Taiwanese and strengthened the self-confidence of its associates based
on its preparedness to use force towards ensuring regional stability 17 . The U.S. deployment of
two carrier groups also surprised Chinese leaders, underscoring China’s miscalculation
concerning the United States’ resolve to resist the use of force by China against Taiwan. The
response of the United States offset the impacts of China’s use of force aimed at curbing the

15. Porch, Douglas. “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy.” Naval
    War College Review 52, no. 3 (1999): 15-48.
16. Chang, James CP. “U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan.” PhD diss., Weatherhead Center for International Affairs,
    Harvard University, 2001.
17. Porch, 1999.

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independence of Taiwan 18 . The confrontation further significantly diminished China’s uncertainty
concerning the intentions of the United States.
The U.S. involvement in the crisis is, however, marred with a fair share of challenges.
The aftermath of the cold war has led to a considerable increase in the regional uncertainty
concerning the role of the U.S. in Asia, with further concern regarding the ‘rise of China’ 19 .
Together, these outcomes challenge the commitment of the U.S. towards defending its regional
strategic partners. Just as the reaction of the U.S. to China’s ‘missile diplomacy’ reinforced the
United States’ opposition in the China-U.S cooperation, the use of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ applied
by the U.S. hardened the attitude of the Chinese towards America 20 . This made is challenging for
Chinese diplomats to collaborate with the foreign policy interests of the United States despite
their understanding of the imperative to avoid conflict between China and the United States.
How well the United States Used Coercion to achieve its Objectives and Major Lessons
Learnt
The United States’ use of military coercion and deterrence policy against China in the
Taiwan Strait confrontation played a fundamental role in influencing the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). Notably, the decision by the United States to deploy two carrier groups enhanced
its commitment to defend Taiwan and tie its credibility to the security of Taiwan 21 . This strategy
has effectively convinced Chinese leaders that conflict in mainland Taiwan can compel the
intervention of the U.S. The use of coercion and deterrence policy by the United States has
played a crucial role in reducing uncertainty in China over the U.S. policy toward Taiwan and

18. Porch, 1999.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

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boosted the confidence of Taiwan. Regardless of the nature and source of conflict, the Taiwanese
believe that they will intervene and provide protection hence strengthening the relationship
between the U.S. and Taiwan 22 .
The Taiwan Strait crisis has enabled the United States to learn crucial lessons and inform
its policies and grand strategies. In the future, the United States understands that changes in its
policies or further deterioration of its relationship with China could provide warning indicators 23 .
If the U.S. were to take action suggesting it could profoundly its policy and strategies towards
Taiwan or abandon its prolonged ‘one China’ policy, then there would be a strong response from
China. Short of such a melodramatic squabble to the United States policy, any decision by
Washington to proceed with actions regarded by Beijing as emboldening Taipei leaders to reject
the demands of the mainland would increase cross-strait crisis risks in the future 24 .
Conclusively, the strategy pursued by China in the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96 is a pity
because the crisis faded away, becoming a distant memory, and its implications have not
received their deserved attention. On the other hand, the United States’ deterrence policy was
crucial in averting China’s use of missile tests to threaten the independence of Taiwan.

22. Porch, 1999.
23. Ibid
24. Ibid

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Bibliography

Chang, James CP. “U.S. Policy toward Taiwan.” PhD diss., Weatherhead Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, 2001.
Porch, Douglas. “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States
Navy.” Naval War College Review 52, no. 3 (1999): 15-48.
Ross, Robert S. “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion.” Credibility, and
the (2000).