Comparative Analysis of Force Management in the US

Comparative Analysis of Force Management in the US

Introduction
The United States army was impoverished when it came out of the Vietnam war, and it
was unmodernized and incapable of expending large-scale maneuver combat. The military
needed to come up with solutions and change its organizational structure to enhance its
performance. It had to develop strategic decision-making, organizational and acquisitional
change, and capability determination. The development and designing of the Army of Excellence
(AOE) was the main component of reform and modernization in the US army’s decade between
the 1970s and 1980s. During the time frame, there was a significant intellectual and tactical
change in the army’s organization and doctrine. This paper will conduct a comparative analysis
of the decision-making process, capability determination, acquisition, organizational
management, and the strategic problems of the US army in the post-Vietnam time frame and the
current time.
The Strategic Problems of the US Army in Post-Vietnam
In 1973, when the US Army withdrew its forces from Vietnam, it was grappling with
poor morale and discipline from the troops and a lack of cohesion (Alessi-Friedlander 2017). The
army’s leadership was attempting to reform in an environment that was transparent where the
necessary land combat costs were being criticized, especially for the discretionary conflicts that
the army was being drawn to after the second world war. The US army faced the insufficiency of
draft derived from the junior leadership. Additionally, the army’s focus on low-intensity fighting
degraded the tactical and technical proficiency in higher-intensity combat and combined arms
(Alessi-Friedlander 2017). The US army’s problems encountered in post-Vietnam predisposed

3
the army to poor performance that could lead to defeat in the 1991 desert war if it did not
improve its tactics and organization.
Comparative Analysis
The technology of missiles in the US army was more developed in 2016 than in the post-
Vietnam era. The US army in 1980 set and integrated the Big five weapons. They include; the
Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Black Hawk Utility, the Apache
helicopter, and the Patriot air defense missile system (Wesley and Bates 2020). The Patriot air
defense missile system was part of the big five projects that Starry had come up with. It had been
unheard of until its usage in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 (Hawkins 2016). The operation
showed the United States Army that missile defense was a reality and there was a possibility of
hitting a missile with a missile. Patriot was utilized to shoot incoming Iraqi Scuds, and nearby
launched ballistic missiles. During the war, Patriot successfully dealt with more than 40 hostile
missiles from the enemy side (Hawkins 2016). Over the years, the technology used on the
missile has dramatically advanced from the one in 1991. The US Army recently published the
“Army Air and Missile Defence (AMD) 2028.” Unlike the Patriot air defense missile system
used in 1991, the AMD equips the US military with an agile, flexible, and integrated AMD force
that can easily defeat adversary missile attacks through active deterrence and passive defense
(Hawkins 2016).
The US army transformed from a capability-based to a modernized army between the
post-Vietnam era to 2020. Post the Vietnam war; the US Army was capability-based for the past
thirty years (Wesley and Bates 2020). The army would analyze and assess the capability
requirements of the battlefield and prepare accordingly. The approach to war has recently
changed, as indicated by the first activities that the US Army Futures Command (AFC)

4
performed upon activation. The AFC pursued the codification of its approach to modernization
(Wesley and Bates 2020). The modernization concept is similar to that of Donn Starry. He
evaluated an anticipated future operational environment, devised how the army should fight to
reconcile a threat, analyzed the capability requirements, and eventually developed a strategy to
modernize the military. The plan was labeled the “Concept-Based Requirements System.” After
the Vietnam war, the focus of the US army on low-intensity fighting degraded the tactical and
technical proficiency in higher-intensity combat and combined arms (Wesley and Bates 2020).
To salvage the situation, Donn initiated a study effort that began with the environment. He noted
the quantitative inferiority of the army then. The Ideas of Donn in 1980 conjured the concept of a
future operational environment (FOE). The US army currently incorporates FOE to prepare for a
potential war between the US and Russia or China. FOE is a composite of anticipated conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the capacities and concepts and bear on the leaders’
decisions. FOE analyzes socioeconomic and technological trends, pacing, and anticipated future
threats. And the existing national strategies that guide army operations.
Military acquisition of knowledge and strategy in the current time and the post-Vietnam
war are similar. The similarity emerges from the fact that the army commanders of both eras sent
a person from the army to learn about the tactics of warfare that are bound to be used by the
adversary. After the Vietnam war, Abram chartered Starry to study the Yom Kippur war in Israel
in 1973 (Wesley and Bates 2020). Abraham instructed Starry to come back with a summary of
the war’s significant lessons to understand what the US would fight against. The lessons learned
from the war tactics of Egypt, Syria, and the soviet equipped states were to impact the US army
training, material development, and doctrine. Similarly, the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) commander, Gen David Perkins, commissioned a team from the US army to study

5
what is regarded as the “Russian New Generation Warfare” (RNGW). Under the direction of the
chief of Infantry, Brigadier Peter Jones, the 2016 study of the RNGW was aimed at analyzing
how the Russian forces and their proxies can employ potentially disruptive technology in
conducting modern warfare. The team aimed to identify the implications of the enhanced
Russian capabilities on the US Army. The overall goal was for the team to ensure that the US
Army, in case of a war eruption, would be able to overmatch the Russian army by applying the
recommendations the team would have made to them. Just like the Sturry study had resulted in
the US army noticing the nitch in its operations, the RNWG study established that the US army
capacities, capabilities, and the doctrine of war fight had to change to salvage the US army from
facing tactical and operation defeat in the battlefield. Therefore, the US army consistently
prepares for war by studying the adversary’s military strategies.
The US Army post-Vietnam and the current army organization concept aim at acquiring
sophisticated weapons to ensure victory on the battlefield. Post the Vietnam war; the Big five
system was employed for the desert battle and the fight against Syria and Egypt. The big five
types of machinery used at the time included the Big five weapons. They include; the Abrams
main battle tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Black Hawk Utility, the Apache helicopter,
and the Patriot air defense missile system (Wesley and Bates 2020). Similarly, in 2019, the Army
Modernisation Strategy (AMS) of the US army has shown its need for new material development
initiatives to enable multi-domain operation (MDO) and the creation of unmatched lethality
against its future adversaries through enhancing cross-functional -team developed solutions for
the support of the modernization priorities of the army. The US army intends to achieve some of
the mechanization and improvements in terms of artillery are long-range precision fires, Army
network, following Generational Combat Vehicles, soldier lethality, and advanced missile

6
defense. Therefore, it is evident that the current US and post-Vietnam armies have a similar
doctrine that believes in enhancing war artillery to win on the battlefield.
Conclusion
The US army has progressed ideologically, strategically, technologically, and
organizationally from the post-Vietnam era to the current times. When the Vietnam war ended,
the US army was in a poor state tactically in terms of recruiting, and the soldiers were quite
demoralized. The Starry strategy was adopted to increase the army’s chances of success in the
desert war. The strategy entailed improving the army’s tactical approach and operational
approaches. The significant markers of the change include adopting the Big five machinery. In
the current era, where the US could potentially go to war with Russia and China, the army has
conducted studies on Russian warfare that, upon implementation, can be better on the battlefield.

7

References

Hawkins Kari. 2016. “Redstone Missiles Light Up Anniversary Of Operation Desert Storm.”
Army University Press. January 2016.
https://www.army.mil/article/160903/redstone_missiles_light_up_anniversary_of_operati
on_desert_storm.
Lt. Gen. Eric J. Wesley, U.S. Army, and US Army Chief Warrant Officer 5 Jon Bates. 2020. “To
Change an Army—Winning Tomorrow.” Army University Press. June 2020.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-
Archives/May-June-2020/Wesley-Winning-Tomorrow/.
Maj. R. Z. Alessi-Friedlander, U.S. Army. 2017. “Learning to Win While Fighting
Outnumbered.” Army University Press. April 2017.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-
Journal/documents/April-2016-Alessi-Friedlander.pdf.