The Ethical Status of Sentient Beings Compels Us to Veganism

The ethical status of sentient beings has been the subject of heated debates throughout
history. Some proponents of the utilitarian argument, such as Peter Singer, argue that what
makes human beings morally reasonable is not reason but sentience. In this context, all
sentient creatures can suffer, have interests, and attempt to escape danger when faced with
threat. For instance, an animal that is hunted in the wild exerts all its energy in escaping from
its predator, just as a human being would. This expression of interests in situations that do not
present suffering indicates that all both humans and animals have interests, which they aim to
protect at all costs. This line of thought is what Francione presents in his argument that all
sentient beings, including fish, have an interest in continued existence, and therefore have an
equal inherent value. By excusing human behavior against the interests of sentient beings to
exist, then human are decidedly odd. Therefore, I agree with Francione that veganism is the
only ethical option, hence we are compelled to veganism due to the ethical status of sentient
beings.
I disagree with Kant’s argument that animals are not ends-in-themselves and that they
lack moral autonomy. This would mean that animals do not deserve respect, hence we are not
obligated to their welfare. While Kant argues that animals are not self-conscious and hence
merely as a means to an end, it is impossible to look into to the foundations of such an
argument. For Kant, he analyses sentient animal nature in relation to that of humans, which is
essentially unfair as all animals are different and have different way of living. According to

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Kant, “the less like human beings an animate being is, the less in deserves equal
consideration. The more like us they are, the more consideration they deserve (Pojman, Paul
and McShane p. 5)” Although how we treat animals speaks a lot about our humanity, it is
worth while to consider in the first place why Kant accords sentient beings an ethical status.
By expressing the concern to treat sentient animals more like us, this only means that they
are worthy of being spared from suffering and killing, which veganism attempts to evade. In
this sense, the Kantian argument provides a good platform for why we have an indirect duty
to sentient animals, hence the need to adopt veganism.
For Kant, the motive for treating or not treating animals cruelly is at the core of his
arguments. However, there are numerous atrocities among human societies, for which the
rule of law bars people from committing murder, stealing, and mistreating other human
beings. In a good number of cases, agents refrain from inflicting such harm due to the nature
of punishment imposed by law, not because of regard to humanity. In a similar sense, arguing
that our moral and inherent dignity by treating animals kindly is insufficient, since we are
already living in an imperfect world. Rather than respecting animal welfare as far as our
moral values go, we could honor sentient animals’ welfare and interests by virtue of them
being sentient, just like humans.
I agree with Francione’s argument become it significantly presents an uncomplicated
solution to on one of the most fought for courses: stopping cruelty against animals. Sentient
beings have an interest in remaining alive, hence they are harmed by death. Animals are
considered to have inherent value, hence the principle of respect whereby we must treat those
individuals with inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value. For Francione,
veganism is the moral baseline of the animal rights movement (Francione p. 10). This implies
rejecting all forms of violence against animals so as to end the ongoing conflict between
human and non-human animals. Furthermore, Francione argues that humans should not

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require any cognitive trait beyond sentience to consider non-human animals as members of
the moral community, which means that they would be entitled to the right of not being
properties of humans. Animals do not need to have human-like cognitive abilities such as
formulation of language or self-awareness to have the right to not being used as resources.
Furthermore, we can treat human being as means only if they provide informed consent
that other rational beings might not provide. On this note, since animals cannot provide
informed consent, we cannot use them at all. We have an obligation to animals not to treat
them as things. If we stopped treating animals as things, we would stop the production of
domestic animals and care for those that we have now. In addition to stopping the breeding
animals for human consumption, we would also leave non-domesticated animals alone. I
reckon with Francione on the concept of “moral schizophrenia” when in comes to animals.
On one hand, we admit to taking animal rights seriously and even keep pets who are
undoubtedly “part of our families” with intrinsic moral value. We value these animals so
much that when they get sick we tend to them and protect them from harm. However, we
decisively refuse to take action for other animals, and trust that the production of products
such as meat involves “humane” treatment.
One of the direst issues raised in the ethical dilemma regarding the moral autonomy of
animals is the issue of animal welfare, which Francione argues is quite different from animal
rights. In this case, animal-welfare laws are predetermined from the property status of
nonhuman animas as “experimental animals”, “food animals”, or “game animals” (Francione
10). Therefore, these laws do not provide significant protection to nonhuman animals because
the fundamental claim is that they are property. When we perceive these animals as property,
then they only possess conditional or extrinsic values as means to our ends. As long as
animals are viewed as property, there can never be any meaningful balance. Even if the
Kantian argument applauds the donkey owner for treating the donkey humanely and taking

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care or it, at the end of it all he would not be willing to save the donkey over the life of a
young human boy.
Importantly, Francione further argues that “although it is not necessary for humans to
eat meat or dairy products and these may well be detrimental to human health and the
environment, we do not ask about the necessity per se of using animals for food” (Francione
p. 10) This proposition touches one of the core moral pillars for veganism that, although there
are better and freely available foods on the planet, we choose to purse food sources that are
produced through unnecessary killing and inhumane treatment of nonanimals involved.
Moreover, the level of care required from humans generally rises above the obvious rational
choice whereby a property owner would be willing to exploit the animal for economic
benefits. For instance,, an individual who owns a cat and nurtures it as a pet might not present
the same human treatment to cows when slaughtering them for meat.
Notably, it has been challenging for humans to support various welfare programs,
although according to Kant this is something that humans should do. He posits that we can
accord animals better treatment, but as long as they are considered means to an ends it would
be impossible to achieve any significant improvements in animal welfare. The best we have
come close is making animal use more efficient (Francione p. 22), for instance, in aspects
such as increasing productivity, achieving more efficient means of production, and reducing
labor costs. Fundamentally, the basic issue of unnecessarily killing or exposure to harsh
living conditions is still unresolved. As such, advances in animal welfare might be easily
considered counterproductive in nature, regardless of the kind of accomplishments that are
proclaimed by animal advocates. Even with organizations such as People for Ethical
Treatment of Animals push for agreements for slaughterhouses to enforce higher standards,
the real change in consciousness should be reflected by the realization that it is wrong to
create the demand for meat. Without a doubt, there are accounts of people who have shifted

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to veganism on seeing the grotesque nature through which their bacon is made. Similarly, this
proclaimed change in consciousness by having slaughter house handle animals gently and
kindly does not contribute to the much needed recognition that animals have interest.
Undoubtedly, the ethical status of sentient beings compel us to veganism. By exploring
the different moral positions of Kant and Francione on human interests and our obligations
towards all sentient beings, the inherent value of animals is too immense to be ignored. The
provision that nonhuman animals present a sentience character to their nature should be the
focal point in charting our moral compass when it comes to ethical solutions to animal cruelty
and inhumane treatment. While Kant’s argument elucidates on the value of the human motive
when dealing with animals that are more or less like us, it leave ample room for “animal
welfarists” to present false improvements that do not have the interests of animals at heart.
On the contrary, Francione acknowledges the inherent value of nonhuman animals and
provides sufficient claim as to why their interests should be protected as much as humans’.
Thus, the ethical status of sentient beings is complicated and multifaceted, and the only real
solution to the ethical dilemmas would be for humans to embrace veganism.

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Works Cited

Francione, Gary L. “Reflections on” Animals, Property, and the Law” and” Rain without
Thunder”.” Law and contemporary problems 70.1 (2007): 9-57.
Pojman, Louis P., Paul Pojman, and Katie McShane. Food ethics. Cengage Learning,