The Realpolitik of the Melian Dialogue Justice vs. Expediency

The context of The Melian Dialogue is based on the decision by the Melians not to
surrender to the Athenian Empire or the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War. According to
the dialogue that ensues between Melians and Athenians’ representatives, Athenian arguments
explaining their right to establish dominance over the Melians are flawed. The Athenians do not
offer any moral justification for their intended annihilation, but instead implied that they needed
dominance over Melians for the pure satisfaction of being a stronger empire. The Athenians urge
the Melians to submit to retain self-preservation but Melians understood for a fact that the siege
of Melos would mean slavery and oppression for their people. In this case, the Melians attempt
to preserve their sovereignty despite of their ties to the Spartans although the Athenians
eventually conquer the island; an ultimate depiction pragmatism and selfishness.
One of the arguments that the Athenians offer is that if the Melians do not surrender to
the Athenian empire they will be destroyed. They are adamant to find any logical reason to
influence Melos alliance just because “the powerful exact what they can and the weak grant what
they must.” This argument means that the Athenians do not care whether the Melians are
enemies or not. It goes against the rules of war to attack a state that retains neutrality during war
especially if the war does not concern their territory. Moreover, the Melians are right to argue
that such an invasion would alarm other neutral states that could potentially become hostile to
the Athenians to evade a similar invasion. The Melians are right to argue that such a decision

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would create further political instability in Greek since it is unlawful to attack a state that
chooses to remain neutral. Although the Athenians seem to portray the idea that Melos is too
insignificant a state for other states in the region to care, there is still a chance that other neutral
states might feel threatened and take up arms against the Athenian Empire. However, the
Athenians believe this is an insignificant factor and maintain that no state would dare defect due
to fear of destruction. They also cite that the Melians forte is merely hope for deliverance, but in
doing so disregard the probability that the Melians might get help from foes of Athens. Despite
their strong political power in Greece, the Athens had several foes that could easily affect their
chance.
The Athenians’ argument that the Melians are weak and taking up arms with Athens was
futile is flawed since they associate this with emotional politics. However, the Melians preserve
the right to defend their state against invasion from Athens with all their might and strength. I
could be the biggest political oversight to just agree to submission without a fight. They argued
that “But you know the fortune of war is sometimes impartial and not always on the side of
numbers” (Thucydides 188). The Melians are right to argue that they are not willing to go down
without a fight since every nation’s government has a duty to protect its citizens from threats and
destructions. Right from the start, the Athenians look down upon the Melians for lacking enough
military resources to go up against a bigger state. However, the Melians position to decline
submission to Athens is morally just. Furthermore, the Melians were sure that the
Lacedaemonians would come to their rescue to the ties of kinship in the event that Athens would
strike. In addition to maintaining that the gods would favor them due to their righteous position,
the Melians had counted on the help of their allies, which would later not happen.

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Although Thucydides explains the Athens decision to conquer Melos as merely a
demonstration of strength to prevent other states from defecting, the attack on Melos was
ruthless and extreme. The Melians sought to understand why the Athenians would not accept
their alliance but rather sought to rule and oppress them even after they declared neutralism. The
Melian’s even questioned this position in dismay, “But must we be your enemies? Will you not
receive us as ends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you? (Thucydides 197) Extreme
mass starvation would later result in Melos surrender, but the move to attack Melos was received
with hostility, especially by Spartans who would late attack Athens. In refusing to submit to a
stronger nation, the Melians risked stability, economic destruction and food insecurity.
Thucydides noted that “the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians
thereupon put to death all who were of military age and made slaves of the women and children
(Thucydides 191). Although all these elements were highly probable right from the beginning of
the Melian Dialogue, the Melians deserves to refuse subjugation and fight for freedom and
independence. I would argue that the fact that a nation was stronger and had a bigger army as
another was not enough reason to invade a weaker state. If this was the norm, the world would
never realize peace as nations would continue to go to war just so that they could demonstrate
their political and military prowess.
The Melian Dialogue presents an overview of negotiations between the Melians and the
Athenians just before Athens invaded Melos. The basis of the argument is Athenians realism that
their military power gave them advantage over the smaller state of Melos. Athens believed in
conquering states to increase their political presence as well as economic power. However, the
principles of war dictate that is unlawful to go against another state simply because it is weaker,
and such a move is bound to lead to more hostility. The arguments of the Athenians are

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bequeathed with mockery and pride, and they maintain that even the gods understand what they
must do as a result of their political power. It is almost as if justice and honor stand no chance in
the face of expediency. Although Melons would later lose, taking up arms against Athens was a
worthy cause.

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Works Cited

Thucydides. “The History of the Peloponnesian War.” Nagle, Brendan D and Burstein Mayer
Stanley. Readings in Greek History: Sources and Interpretations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.