Summary of Toulmin’s Argument

Stephen Toulmin’s argument centers on the definition of the term ‘exist’. There lacks a precise
definition of the term ‘exist’. He parallels the question of whether electrons exist with the question of
whether contours exist. A child who is asking whether contours exist may be intrigued by the existence
of an equator which is an imaginary line that is at the center of the earth. Contours that are seen on maps
along with the equator as well as other latitudes (Toulmin, 1953). If the question of contours exit is
posed, there is no clear answer. The lack of a clear answer is based on the fact that the question lacks
clarity. The answer thus depends on the manner of speaking. If the question is restated to whether or not
there is a line on the ground that marks places with the same attitude, clarity will not yet be achieved. The
question would still have a yes and no answer. The rephrasing of the question would continue until the
ambiguity in the question is eliminated.
If the question is posed in the form of whether or not there is anything to show for contours or
whether on the terrain white lines that are visible exist, the question will have eliminated the ambiguity.
The question can then be answered, and explanations can be given to the child who posed the question.
The child, in this case, would be asking whether contours exist as opposed to does not exist anymore or
has ceased to be in existence (Toulmin, 1953). Toulmin argues that this is the same way in which the
term ‘exists’ is used in atoms, electrons, fields, and genes. It is also the same way that exists means in
other theoretical entities in physical sciences. The question of exist would practically mean whether or not
there is anything to show for them. It would also mean that electrons can either exist if there is anything
to show for them or are just theoretical fiction. If a question of whether neutrinos exist is posed to a
physical scientist, they will work towards the production of neutrinos of ensuring that they are made
visible. Such an undertaking would produce something to justify the existence of neutrinos.

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A problem arises when explaining the existence of subatomic particles relevant to neutrinos.
Subatomic particles are not visible under normal circumstances to the naked eye. The production of
neutrinos is more complex than the production of a dodo or a nine-foot man. To this end, the definition f
producing must be made clear. Scientists have overtime stated that some things are acceptable. These
include microscope photographs as well as cloud-chamber pictures of a-ray tracks. Scientists have
accepted that these demonstrations are sufficient and can be compared to being shown a live dodo
(Toulmin, 1953). The two should be sufficient proof the subjects exist. If the explanation provided by
scientists is rejected as being insufficient, then it is difficult to dictate what more one can ask for. Another
critical question that Toulmin poses is what if the demonstration of the existence of subatomic particles
was possible. If one could provide visual evidence that neutrinos existed, would that mean that that is the
end? Toulmin answers in the negative. The implication is that if the demonstration of a preferred type is
not possible, this does not necessarily mean that the subject does not exist.
If one is talking about unicorns or nine-foot men but is unable to show anything for them,
individuals may come to the conclusion that nine-foot men as well as unicorns are imaginary and are a
myth. However, the same principle does not apply to subatomic particles. Not all theoretical entities can
be deemed to be non-existent if there lacks physical proof of their existence. One should not demand a
photograph of a theoretical entity to prove that it exists (Toulmin, 1953). Even when no demonstration
that such an entity exists cannot be given, it would be improper to say that the entity does not exist.
Toulmin compares the rejection of atoms to the fact that there lacks visual evidence of the rejection of
contours because no visible marks exist on the ground. The existence of an entity can only be rejected
when its explanatory fertility is lost. Scientists would be happy if all entities they refer to could be shown
to exist. However, that is impractical since at different stages of scientific advancement, a scientific
theory is accepted before questions of existence can be posed.
A practical example of the development of a scientific theory relates to the scientific work on
atoms and molecules. The kinetic theory of matter and the theory of chemical combinations had a huge

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impact on the field of science. As the two theories were coined, no explanation about the concepts
covered existed. Later in 1905, Einstein demonstrated the concept of Brownian motion. The conclusion is
that major advancements in atomic theory were achieved when no concrete evidence existed on the
existence of atoms. In science, questions of existence should thus not be the main center of attention.
Theoretical entities are important in ensuring that science is developed.
Scientists are therefore called to accept a theory before beginning to question whether or not,
whatever is covered in the theory exists. Scientists begin by committing themselves and agreeing that
various things covered in theories exist. This introduces the problem of man Friday fallacy. When a
scientist introduces a theory that covers new concepts, it is safe to assume that they are committed to the
existence of the entities they introduce. However, questioning whether genes or subatomic particles exist
moves away from the original phenomena that is explained in theories. Theoretical entities in the mind of
a scientist are not important as the usefulness of the entities as theoretical fictions. A converse man day
fallacy also exists. When one accepts a theory long before it can be subjected to strict scrutiny or visual
representations obtained, then items such as cloud chamber photographs that prove the visual existence of
certain theoretical entities are overrated. Cloud chamber photographs are instead seen to be bringing one
closer to what a scientist speaks as a result of mere illusion. A theory does not stand or fall based on the
results of cloud chambers or any other experiments. The acceptance of the existence of electrons cannot
be pegged on cloud-chamber photographs. Theories on electrons were advanced before cloud chambers
were introduced. The implication is that technology is advancing and some theoretical entities could be
proven to exist in the future.
Argument on why Toulmin is Wrong
Toulmin defines ‘exist’ in three ways. Exist could mean that something is an imagination. It
could also mean exist in the sense of lines in a map or used to exist but no longer exists. He then goes
ahead to state that sub-atomic particles fall under the category of contours that exist in the sense of lines
of maps. Toulmin’s argument is wrong since he attempts to compare two entities that do not have

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similarities. Contours are defined as imaginary lines that show areas that have the same attitude. Contours
are designed by geologists who focus on showing various relief features on maps (Carlson, 2015).
Contours, unlike atoms, only exist on maps. In contrast, electrons are not imaginary. While they have no
known substructure, they are not the invention of scientists but rather a product of in-depth research.
In proving the existence of electrons and contours, different methods need to be applied. The
existence of contours can not be proven through scientific experiments. Scientists have not invested in
analyzing the presence or lack of it in relation to contours. Contours are isohypses in maps that connect
different regions with the same elevation. In labelling the elevation of various points on a map, geologists
have relied on index contours. These lines are then bolded to ensure that they can easily be read. If the
lines are closer to each other, the indication is that there is a steep slope. On the other hand, if the lines are
far apart, the indication is that there is a gradual slope. Evidently, contours only exist in maps, and it
would be misguided to look for physical lines on the ground. In contrast, electrons are not dependent on
an artificial creation for them to exist. The description of electrons is based on an experiment that was
conducted by J.J. Thompson in the year 1897 (Stanford, 2020). The experiment has been interpreted by
some scholars to mean that cathode rays consist of electrons. Scientists have, over time, come to the
conclusion that the explanation that electrons are negative electricity carried by particles of matter is
plausible. A hypothesis was created, and then various scientists worked on the hypothesis to prove it was
true. The same cannot be said of contours since no experiments have been conducted to show their
existence.
Another key difference lies in the fact that electrons and other subatomic particles are based on
scientific theories. In contrast, contours did not emerge as a result of a theory. Toulmin rightfully
describes the atomic theory that had a huge impact on science. The atomic theory helped in explaining the
structure of the atom. Scientists worked on describing electrons as part of the structure of the atom. While
no physical proof was obtained on the existence of electrons, the theory was developed further through a
series of research and experiments. Contours are not a product of theories that have been reworked and

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developed over the years. Instead, they are an invention of geologists who wanted to make the
interpretation of maps easier. It would be a misnomer to group the two together and use the same
definition of the term exist.

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References

Carlson, T. A. (2015). Contours of Conversion: The Geography of Islamization in Syria,
600–1500. Journal of American Oriental Society, 135(4), 791-816.
Stanford, P. K. (2020). Scientific realism, the atomic theory, and the catch-all hypothesis: Can
we test fundamental theories against all serious alternatives? The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science.
Toulmin, S. (1953). Do Sub-Microscopic Entities Exist?. The Philosophy of Science, The
Hutchinson Publishing Group, London, Reprinted in: Introductory readings in the
philosophy of science, eds. ED Klemke, R. Hollinger & DW Rudge, 3rd edn, Prometheus
Books, Amherst (NY).