Sun Tzu and Clausewitz

Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are considered to be theorists of military history. Each of these men brings a unique perspective to the discussion of wars that include several nations’ militaries. As a result, they express their views on the factors that contribute to conflicts and the strategies that countries should employ to address the disputes. According to this assessment, Clausewitz’s nineteenth-century perspective on war does not reflect the concepts that Sun Tzu outlined.

In their theories, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz draw parallels between war and politics, although they disagree on when the latter begins. The political target is the objective, war is the means to achieve it, and standards can never be evaluated in isolation from their purpose (Echevarria, 2003). And by describing war as a duel, he illustrates that using military force becomes necessary to achieve a political objective. In Clausewitz’s view, war is no different than announcing a duel when diplomatic attempts have failed, and physical conflict is necessary to settle scores. Sun Tzu says, “when the army is engaged, the general normally receives his directives first from the sovereign.” As Clausewitz said, the government must declare war to implement its policies. Unlike Clausewitz, Sun Tzu’s definition of war encompasses strategies that often begin long before the physical battle. “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” (Paquette, 1991). Even though Clausewitz did not dispute the superiority of armed conflict in resolving international disputes, it appears that if peace were to be achieved without resorting to violence, Clausewitz would not consider the resulting political conflict to be a war.

Sun Tzu is obsessed with victory, yet he does not recommend giving up anything precious. He wants desperately to avoid a confrontation with the enemy. As Sun Tzu outlined, this is the primary objective of any leader. If a leader can get the other side to surrender without too much bloodshed, peace can be achieved more swiftly and with less difficulty. Long-term hostility leaves emotional scars and fosters resentment amongst adversaries. Rather than relying on brute force, Sun Tzu advocates for a combination of these factors: fluidity, adaptability, surprise, intelligence, and deception. He claims that the prudent commander who applies these principles would emerge victorious. Commanders with foresight know that the key to winning is keeping the enemy guessing, off-balance, and reacting rather than acting. Sun Tzu considers military force to be a near-last resort. Sun Tzu’s ideas appeal because they prioritize a quick and painless conclusion to conflict while achieving victory. Using this strategy wisely can save lives, protect property, and maintain public support.

Compared to Sun Tzu, Clausewitz’s view on military strategy is radically different. Regarding military strategy, Clausewitz was primarily concerned with the employment of overwhelming force and reducing the likelihood of casualties and other complications during operations. He said that friction is defined by pain, perplexity, weariness, and terror. The flaw in his logic was that it led him to get overly fixated on the idea of a single, objective center of gravity. Finding the conflict’s pivotal point at that crucial moment was a dominant focus in Clausewitz’s ideas. In this view, Clausewitz fails to consider that combat frequently features several secondary centers of gravity. One can get an advantage by isolating and focusing on one of these many small centers of gravity. Multiple weak points can be attacked at once to throw off an opponent’s balance quickly.

References

Echevarria, A. J. (2003). Clausewitz’s center of gravity: It’s not what we thought. Naval War College Review, 56(1), 108-123.

Paquette, L. (1991). Strategy and time in Clausewitz’s on war and Sun Tzu’s the art of war. Comparative Strategy, 10(1), 37-51.